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This paper analyzes voluntary disclosure equilibria when the voluntary disclosure model
presented in WAGENHOFER (1990)ismodiﬁedsoas toincludeﬁxed disclosurecostsas usedin
VERRECCHIA (1983). Itturnsoutthatincorporatingbothdisclosureandproprietarycostsrules
out full disclosure equilibria. Moreover, it yields additional disclosure equilibria that differ
signiﬁcantly from the equilibria in VERRECCHIA (1983) and WAGENHOFER (1990). Thus, in
the extended model the ﬁrm is provided with additional incentives to withhold its private
information from the public.
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Voluntary disclosure models serve to analyze disclosure strategies of privately informed ﬁrms in
particular settings. In many such models, full disclosure of private information is an equilibrium
strategy (see, for instance, GROSSMAN (1981), MILGROM (1981), JOVANOVIC (1982), MILGROM
and ROBERTS (1986), and WAGENHOFER (1990)). From a theoretical point of view, such equilibria
are interesting in that ﬁrms are voluntarilywillingto disclose all their privateinformation,leaving
no need for any mandatory disclosures. In reality, however, one observes that ﬁrms are subject to
mandatory disclosures. The existence of such disclosure rules would thus indicate that ﬁrms do
have incentives to withhold information from the public. Such partial disclosure equilibria occur,
for instance, in the disclosure models of VERRECCHIA (1983) and WAGENHOFER (1990), which
both introduce costs of disclosure.
In VERRECHIA (1983) the ﬁrm incurs disclosure costs if, and only if, it discloses its private
information. Ingeneral,thesedisclosurecostscanbeinterpretedasthecostsarisingfrompreparing





as the costs of disclosure increase, more and more information becomes not valuable enough for
disclosure, resulting in a full nondisclosure equilibrium in the end.
WAGENHOFER (1990) analyzes voluntary disclosure strategies of a ﬁrm that is faced with a
strategic opponent likea competing ﬁrm,say. In this model the ﬁrm possesses privateinformation
that is valuable to the ﬁnancial market as well as to the opponent. While the market uses any
publicly disclosed information to revise the value of the ﬁrm, the opponent may ﬁnd the disclosed
information sufﬁciently valuable to take an adverse action that imposes costs on the ﬁrm. These
indirect costs of disclosure are referred to as proprietary costs. When determining its disclosure
strategy, the ﬁrm thus weighs out the beneﬁts of a better ﬁrm value against the possibility of
incurring proprietary costs.
In WAGENHOFER (1990) it is shown that a full disclosure equilibrium always exists and that a
partial disclosure equilibrium may exist, albeit not frequently. In a partial disclosure equilibrium,
nondisclosure of information avoids incurring proprietary costs. Moreover, the ﬁrm nondiscloses
its information either if it is bad, or if it is good but not good enough to accept the proprietary
costs that will result from a public disclosure. Furthermore, it is shown that a full nondisclosure
1The same assumption applies to the model of WAGENHOFER (1990) and the model presented in this paper.
2strategy can never be part of an equilibrium.
This paper combines the models of VERRECCHIA (1983) and WAGENHOFER (1990) so as to
incorporate both disclosure and proprietary costs. It will be shown that the presence of both cost
driversgives rise to types of disclosure equilibriathat differfrom the types arising inVERRECCHIA
(1983) and WAGENHOFER (1990). Consequently, the ﬁrm has a greater incentive to nondisclose its
private information.
2 A Voluntary Disclosure Model
Thegametheoreticalmodel used to modeltheﬁrm’sdisclosuredecision isbased on WAGENHOFER
(1990) and includes three risk neutral decision makers: the ﬁrm, an opponent, and the ﬁnancial
market. The ﬁrm possesses private information, which is described by a continuous random
variable
~







) . The probability distribution function of
~
y is denoted by
F and is assumed to be common knowledge. The realization of
~
y is denoted by
y and is private information for the ﬁrm and not known to either the opponent or the ﬁnancial
market. Examples of what this private information can represent are R&D expenses, production
costs, or product quality. In fact, it can be given any meaning as long as it can be represented by a
one-dimensional compact interval. So, what the private informationcannot contain is information
about both quality and costs.
The private information






























The gameisplayed in twostages. In theﬁrst stage, theﬁrmdecides whether or not it discloses





0 and these costs do not depend on the contents of the information released. Moreover,
a public disclosure is assumed to contain truthful information only and is observed by both the
opponent and the ﬁnancial market.
In the second stage, the opponent and the ﬁnancial market observe the ﬁrm’s disclosure
decision and update their beliefs about the value of the ﬁrm. Furthermore, the opponent decides
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Summarizing,therearetwotypes of costs that affect the ﬁrm’sdisclosure decision: disclosure
costs and proprietary costs. Whether or not the ﬁrm incurs proprietary costs, depends on the
opponent’s beliefs about ﬁrm value. The ﬁrm, however, can inﬂuence these beliefs by disclosing
its private information. When making such a public disclosure, the ﬁrm incurs disclosure costs.
Thus, one can regard disclosure costs as direct costs of disclosure and proprietary costs as indirect
costs of disclosure.
The objective of the ﬁrm is to maximize the expected ﬁrm value as perceived by the ﬁnancial
market. A disclosure strategy for the ﬁrm prescribes for each possible realized ﬁrm value
y of
~
y whether it is disclosed or not.
3 For this purpose, let
D
￿
Y denote the subset of realized





D be the subset of realizations that
are withheld from the public. Given the disclosure strategy of the ﬁrm, the beliefs about ﬁrm
value of both the opponent and the ﬁnancial market are determined as follows. If realized ﬁrm
value
y belongs to




N, the information is withheld and the beliefs about ﬁrm value equal the expected ﬁrm value
conditional on observing nondisclosure. In case nondisclosure occurs with zero probability, then
the conditional expectation cannot be calculated and the beliefs about ﬁrm valuemay be any value
￿
2








































































































N. Note that the models of VERRECCHIA (1983) and









A disclosure strategy constitutes a sequential equilibrium (cf. KREPS and WILSON (1982)) if
the ﬁrm has an incentive to disclose any
y
2
D and to withhold any
y
2
N, while taking into
3Similar to WAGENHOFER (1990), attentionis restricted to pure strategies only.
4account the beliefs of the opponent and the ﬁnancial market. The equilibrium nondisclosure set





















































Y , respectively. When neither case applies, one speaks of a partial disclosure equilibrium.
















Y, i.e. only bad informationisnondisclosed. At the other




0 , so that the model coincides with WAGENHOFER
(1990). Inthatcase, afulldisclosureequilibriumalwaysexistsandafullnondisclosureequilibrium



























y . Hence, both bad and good information is withheld. The following











(1) a full disclosure strategy is never part of a sequential equilibrium,























































































0, even if they are relatively small
compared to the proprietary costs
C
p. Let us illustrate Theorem 2.1 with an example.
Example 2.2 Consider a ﬁrm whose private information
~





). First, let us consider the equilibria for the models introduced in VERRECCHIA (1983)




0 , we obtain the model of

























0 , we obtain the model of WAGENHOFER (1990). In that




Treshold Value K Treshold Value K
Pr opri et a ry  Cost s
C
p
Propr i e t ar y  Cos t s
C
p
Disclosure Costs Cd = 0 Disclosure Costs Cd = 0.1
II: N=(0,d1)  [K,d2)
IV: N=[K,d2)
I: N= 0 V: N=(0,d1)
VIa+b: N=(0,d2)
VII: N=(0,1)
IIa+b: N=(0,d1)  [K,d2)
III: N=(0,d1)  [K,1)























case, full disclosure of information is an equilibrium strategy. A partial disclosure equilibrium































Since nondisclosure is only beneﬁcial if it deters proprietary costs, also bad information has to be
withheld from the public. For if the opponent observes nondisclosure, he does not know whether
the reason for nondisclosure is that the ﬁrm has bad information,or that it wantsto avoid incurring
proprietary costs. Partial dislcosure equilibria, however, need not exist. Their existence depends
on the values of the parameters
C
p and
K. The left panel of Figure 1 depicts the existence of































0 , we obtain the model of VERRECCHIA (1983) and the only







)(see areas V, VIa,
and VIb in Figure 1).
Comparingthestructureofthedisclosureequilibriaintheseveral modelsrevealsthefollowing
6differences. First, a full disclosure equilibrium does not exist in our model. This is due to the fact
that such an equilibrium cannot occur in VERRECCHIA (1983), which features a similar ﬁxed cost




















































contrasts the result in VERRECCHIA (1983), where a full nondisclosure equilibrium only arises
when the disclosure costs
C























2 are not strict inequalities anymore.
























) may exist. Note, however, that the former two are similar to the equilibrium
nondisclosure set in VERRECCHIA (1983).
The ﬁnal major difference is found in the opponent’s action when he observes nondisclosure.
In WAGENHOFER (1990), nondisclosure implies that the opponent does not undertake the adverse
action, so that the ﬁrm does not incur any proprietary costs. In our model, however, this is not








).N o w ,









), so that the
opponentimposesproprietarycostsontheﬁrmbytakinghisadverseaction. Sincenondisclosureis
no means to avoid incurring proprietary costs, only the ﬁxed disclosure costs drive nondisclosure,
just as in VERRECCHIA (1990). In VERRECCHIA (1990), however, only relatively bad information
is nondisclosed (see (2)). So why do ﬁrms disclose relatively bad information in this case? The
















K, which implies that the proprietary costs
C
p exceed the disclosure costs
C
d.S o ,
it is beneﬁcial for a ﬁrm to disclose its bad information at costs
C




































), respectively. So, although the reason for nondisclosure in these equilibria is
t h es a m ea si nV ERRECCHIA (1983), namely avoiding disclosure costs, the presence of proprietary




disclosure of private information can be an equilibrium strategy. The two models differ in the
driving force behind these partial disclosure equilibria. In VERRECCHIA (1983), the incentive for
nondisclosureisdisclosurecosts, whileinWAGENHOFER (1990),thisincentiveisproprietarycosts,
i.e. costs imposed by an adverse action of an opponent. In this paper we analyzed a voluntary
disclosure model that incorporates both disclosure costs and proprietary costs. It was shown that
additional equilibrium disclosure strategies arise that differ from the ones arising in VERRECCHIA
(1983) and WAGENHOFER (1990): full disclosure equilibria cease to exist while full nondisclosure
equilibria may arise. Furthermore, when disclosure costs drive nondisclosure, we have seen, for
instance, that nondisclosing only mediocre information can be an equilibrium; an equilibrium that
is excluded in both VERRECCHIA (1983) and WAGENHOFER (1990).
So, even though only one of the two cost drivers may provide the ﬁrm with an incentive to
nondisclose its private information, the sheer presence of the other cost driver gives rise to new
disclosure equilibria. Taking into account both disclosure and proprietary costs, increases the
ﬁrm’s incentives to withhold its private informationfrom the public.
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rational beliefs of the opponent and the ﬁnancial market when they observe nondisclosure. I will
show that there exists an information set
N
￿
Y of positive measure for which the ﬁrm prefers
nondisclosure.
To constitute a full disclosure equilibrium, the ﬁrm must prefer disclosure to nondisclosure























Y .S i n c e











Y , the worst possible sequentially




















































































































































N, the ﬁrm prefers nondisclosure whenever its private
8information belongs to
N. Hence, full disclosure cannot be part of a sequential equilibrium.
















































































































































































































































To prove part (3), take
y
2
N.S i n c e


























































































































GROSSMAN, S.: "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product
Quality," Journal of Law and Economics 24 (1981), 461- 483.
JOVANOVIC, B.:"Truthful Disclosure of Information," Bell Journal of Economics 13 (1982), 863-
894.
KREPS,D .a n dR .W ILSON: "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica 50 (1982), 863-894.
MILGROM, P.: "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell
Journal of Economics 12 (1981,) 380-391.
MILGROM,Pa n dJ .R OBERTS: "Relying on the Informationof Interested Parties," Rand Journal of
Economics 17 (1986), 18-32.
VERRECCHIA, R.: "Discretionary Disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics 5 (1983),
179-194.
WAGENHOFER, A.: "Voluntary Disclosure with a Strategic Opponent," Journal of Accounting and
Economics 12 (1990), 341-363.




Treshold Value K Treshold Value K
Pr opri et a ry  Cost s
C
p
Propr i e t ar y  Cos t s
C
p
Disclosure Costs Cd = 0 Disclosure Costs Cd = 0.1
II: N=(0,d1)  [K,d2)
IV: N=[K,d2)
I: N= 0 V: N=(0,d1)
VIa+b: N=(0,d2)
VII: N=(0,1)
IIa+b: N=(0,d1)  [K,d2)
III: N=(0,d1)  [K,1)









FIGURE1: The existence of partial disclosure equilibriainrelationtothe valuesof
K and
C
p when
C
d
=
0(left panel) and
C
d
=
0
:
1(right panel).